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ABSTRACT.  I  present  in  this  paper  an  analysis  of  the  Simulation  Argument  from  a
dialectical  contextualist’s  standpoint.  This  analysis  is  grounded  on  the  reference  class
problem. I begin with describing in detail Bostrom’s Simulation Argument. I identify then
the  reference  class  within  the  Simulation  Argument.  I  also  point  out  a  reference  class
problem, by applying the argument successively to three different reference classes: aware-
simulations, imperfect simulations and immersion-simulations. Finally, I point out that there
are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument,  depending on the chosen
reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature.
1. The Simulation Argument
I shall propose in what follows an analysis of the Simulation Argument, recently described by
Nick Bostrom (2003). I will first describe in detail the Simulation Argument (SA for short),
focusing in particular on the resulting counter-intuitive consequence. I will then show how
such a consequence can be avoided, based on the analysis of the reference class underlying
SA, without having to give up one’s pre-theoretical intuitions.
The general idea behind SA can be stated as follows. It is very likely that post-human
civilizations will possess a computing power that will be completely out of proportion with
that of ours today. Such extraordinary computing power should give them the ability to carry
out completely realistic human simulations,  such as ensuring that the inhabitants of these
simulations are aware of their own existence, in all respects similar to ours. In such a context,
it  is  likely  that  post-human  civilizations  will  devote  part  of  their  computer  resources  to
carrying out  simulations  of  the human civilizations  that  preceded them. In this  case,  the
number of simulated humans should greatly exceed the number of authentic humans. Under
such conditions, taking into account the simple fact that we exist leads to the conclusion that
it  is  more likely  that  we are part  of  the  simulated  humans,  rather  than  of  the  authentic
humans.
Bostrom thus points out that the Simulation Argument is based on the following three
hypotheses:
2(1) it is very likely that humanity will not reach a post-human stage
(2) it  is  very  unlikely  that  post-human  civilizations  will  carry  out  simulations  of  the
human races that preceded them
(3) it is very likely that we are currently living in a simulation carried out by a post-human
civilization
and it follows that at least one of these three assumptions is true.
For the purposes of the present analysis, it is also useful at this stage to emphasize the
underlying dichotomous  structure of SA. The first  step in  the reasoning consists  then in
considering, by dichotomy, that either (i) humanity will not reach a post-human stage, or (ii)
it will actually reach such a post-human stage. The first of these two hypotheses corresponds
to the disjunct (1) of the argument. We consider then the hypothesis that humanity will reach
a post-human stage and thus continue its existence for many millennia. In such a case, it can
also be considered likely that post-human civilizations will possess both the technology and
the skills necessary to perform human simulations. A new dichotomy then arises: either (i)
these post-human civilizations will not perform such simulations — this is the disjunct (2) of
the argument; or (ii) these post-human civilizations will actually perform such simulations.
In the latter case, it will follow that the number of simulated humans will greatly exceed the
number of humans. The probability of living in a simulation will therefore be much greater
than that of living in the shoes of an ordinary human. The conclusion then follows that we,
the inhabitants of the Earth, are probably living in a simulation carried out by a post-human
civilization. This last conclusion constitutes the disjunct(3) of the argument. An additional
step leads then to the conclusion that at least one of the hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) is true.
The dichotomous structure underlying SA can thus be described step by step as follows:
(4) humanity will either not reach a post-human stage or reach a post-
human stage
dichotomy 1
(1) humanity will not reach a post-human stage hypothesis 1.1
(5) humanity will reach a post-human stage hypothesis 1.2
(6) post-human  civilizations  will  be  able  to  perform  human
simulations
from (5)
(7) post-human  civilizations  will  either  not  perform  human
simulations or will perform them 
dichotomy 2
(2) post-human civilizations will not perform human simulations hypothesis 2.1
(8) post-human civilizations will perform human simulations hypothesis 2.2
(9) the proportion of simulated humans will far exceed that of
humans
from (8)
(3) it is very likely that we are currently living in a simulation
carried out by a post-human civilization
from (9)
(10) at least one of the hypotheses (1), (2) and (3) is true from (1), (2), (3)
It is  also worth mentioning an element that results  from the very interpretation of the
argument.  For  as  Bostrom  (2005)  points  out,  the  Simulation  Argument  must  not  be
misinterpreted. This is not an argument that leads to the conclusion that (3) is true, namely
that we are currently living in a simulation carried out by a post-human civilization. The core
of SA is thus that one of the hypotheses (1), (2) or (3) at least is true.
This nuance of interpretation being mentioned, the Simulation Argument is not without its
problems. Because SA leads to the conclusion that at least one of the assumptions (1), (2) or
(3) is true, and that in the situation of ignorance in which we find ourselves, we can consider
the latter as equiprobable. As Bostrom himself notes (Bostrom, 2003): “In the dark forest of
our current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one's credence roughly evenly between
3(1), (2) and (3)”.  However, according to our pre-theoretical intuition, the probability of (3) is
nil or at best extremely close to 0, so the conclusion of the argument has the consequence of
increasing the probability that (3) is true from zero to a probability of about 1/3. Thus, the
problem  with  the  Simulation  Argument  is  precisely  that  it  shifts  — via  its  disjunctive
conclusion  — from a  zero  or  almost  zero  probability  concerning  (3)  to  a  much  higher
probability of about 1/3. Because a probability of 1/3 for the hypotheses (1) and (2) is not a
priori shocking, but is completely counter-intuitive as far as hypothesis (3) is concerned. It is
in this sense that we can talk about the problem posed by the Simulation Argument and the
need to find a solution to it.
As a preliminary point, it is worth considering what constitutes the paradoxical aspect of
SA. What indeed gives SA a paradoxical nature? For SA differs from the class of paradoxes
that  lead  to  a  contradiction.  In  paradoxes  such  as  the  Liar  or  the  sorites  paradox,  the
corresponding reasoning leads to a contradiction1. However, nothing of the sort can be seen
at the level of SA, which belongs, from this point of view, to a different class of paradoxes,
including the Doomsday Argument and Hempel’s problem. It is indeed a class of paradoxes
whose conclusion is contrary to intuition, and which comes into conflict with the set of all
our beliefs. In the Doomsday Argument then, the conclusion that taking into account our
rank within the class of humans who have ever existed has the effect that an apocalypse is
much more likely than one might have initially thought, offends the set of all our beliefs.
Similarly, in Hempel's problem, the fact that a blue umbrella confirms the hypothesis that all
crows are black comes in conflict with the body of our knowledge. Similarly within SA, what
finally appears paradoxical at first analysis is that SA leads to a probability of the hypothesis
that we are currently living in a simulation created by post-humans, which is higher than that
resulting from our pre-theoretical intuition.
2. The reference class problem and the Simulation Argument
The conclusion of the reasoning underlying SA, based on the calculation of the future ratio
between  real  and  simulated  humans,  albeit  counter-intuitive,  nevertheless  results  from a
reasoning that appears a priori valid. However, such reasoning raises a question, which is
related to the reference class that is inherent to the argument itself2. Indeed, it appears that
SA has, indirectly, a particular reference class, which is that of human simulations. But what
constitutes a simulation? The original argument implicitly refers to a reference class which is
that of virtual simulations of humans, of a very high quality and by nature indistinguishable
from  authentic  humans.  However,  there  is  some  ambiguity  about  the  very  notion  of  a
simulation and the question arises as to the applicability  of SA to other types of human
1 The Liar is thus both true and false. In the sorites paradox, an object with a certain number of grains of sand is
both a heap and a non-heap. Similarly, in Goodman's paradox, an emerald is both green and grue, and therefore
both green and blue after a certain date. Finally, in the Sleeping Beauty paradox, the probability that the piece
fell on heads before the awakening of the Sleeping Beauty is 1/2 by virtue of one reasoning mode, and only 1/3
by virtue of an alternative reasoning.
2 William Eckhardt (2013, p. 15) considers that  — in the same way as the Doomsday Argument (Eckhardt
1993, 1997, Franceschi, 2009)  — the problem inherent in SA comes from the use of retrocausality and the
problem related to the definition of the reference class:  “if simulated, are you random among human sims?
hominid sims? conscious sims?”.
4simulations3.  Indeed,  we  are  in  a  position  to  conceive  of  somewhat  different  types  of
simulations which also fall intuitively within the scope of the argument.
As a preliminary point, it is worth specifying here the nature of the simulations carried out
by computer means referred to in the original argument. Implicitly, SA refers to computer
simulations carried out by means of conventional computers composed of silicon chips. But
it  can  also  be  envisaged  that  simulations  are  carried  out  using  computers  built  from
components using DNA properties and molecular biology. Recent research has shown that it
is possible to implement high-performance algorithms (Adleman 1994, 1998) and to produce
computer  components  (Benenson  &  al.  2001,  MacDonald  &  al.  2006)  based  on  bio-
calculation techniques that  exploit  in particular  the combinations  of the four components
(adenine, cytosine, guanine, thymine) of the DNA molecule. If such a field of research were
to expand significantly and make it possible to produce computers at least as powerful as
conventional computers, this type of bio-computers could legitimately fall within the scope
of SA as well. Because the fact that the simulations are carried out using conventional or
biological computers4 does not alter the scope of the argument. In any case, the result is that
the proportion of simulated humans will be much higher than that of real humans, due to the
properties of simulated reality using digital means, because the computer does not know the
physical limits that are those of matter.
It can also be observed preliminarily that Bostrom explicitly refers to simulations carried
out using computer means. However, the question arises as to whether simulated humans
could not consist  of perfectly  successful physical  copies of real humans.  In such a case,
simulations5 could be extremely difficult to discern. A priori, such a variation also constitutes
an acceptable version of SA. However,  there is  a  difference with the original  argument,
which also highlights Bostrom's preferential choice of computer simulations. Indeed, in the
original  argument  there is  a very significant  disproportion between humans simulated by
computer means on the one hand and real humans on the other. This is the premise (9) of the
argument: “the proportion of simulated humans will far exceed that of humans”. As Bostrom
points out, the former would then be much more numerous than the latter, due to the very
nature of computer simulations. It is this disproportion that then allows us to conclude (3)
“we most  probably  live  in  a  simulation  carried  out  by  a  post-human civilization”.  With
simulations of a physical nature, one would not a priori have such a disproportion, and the
scope of  the  conclusion  would  be  somewhat  different.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  post-
humans manage to perform simulations of a physical nature, the number of which would be
equal to that of real humans. In this case, the proportion of simulated humans would be 1/2
(whereas it is close to 1 in the original argument). Premise (9) would then become: “the
proportion of simulated humans and actual humans will be 1/2”. And this would only allow
us  to  conclude  (3)  “the  probability  that  we are  simulations  performed  by a  post-human
civilization is equal to 1/2”. As can be seen, this would result in a significantly attenuated
version of SA. The difference with the original version of SA is that the simulation argument
for physical simulations applies with less force than the original argument. However, if the
conditions were to change and this would result in the future in a disproportion of the same
nature as with computer simulations for physical simulations, SA would then apply with all
3 We will leave aside here the question of whether an infinite number of simulated humans should be taken into
account. This could be the case if the ultimate level of reality were abstract. In this case, the reference class
could include simulated humans who identify themselves, for example, with matrices of very large integers.
But Bostrom answers such an objection in his FAQ (www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html) and points out
that in this case, the calculations are no longer valid (the denominator is infinite) and the ratio is not defined.
We will therefore leave this hypothesis aside, focusing our argument on what constitutes the core of SA, i.e. the
case where the number of human simulations is finite.
4 The same would be true if simulations were carried out using quantum computers.
5 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point, as well as the point about computers built from
components using DNA properties and molecular biology.
5its force. In any event, the following analysis would then apply in the same way to this last
category of simulations.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, we shall focus in turn on different types of
human simulations, which are likely to be part of the SA reference class, and the ensuing
conclusions at the argument level. Because the very question of defining the reference class
for  SA leads  to  questions  about  whether  or  not  several  types  of  simulations  should  be
included within the SA scope. However, the question of the definition of the reference class
for SA thus appears closely related to the nature of the future taxonomy of the beings and
entities that will populate the Earth in the near or distant future. There is no question here of
claiming exhaustiveness, given the speculative nature of such an area. However, it is possible
to determine to what extent SA can also be applied to simulations of a different nature from
those  mentioned  in  the  original  argument,  but  which  have  equal  legitimacy.  We  shall
examine  then  in  turn:  conscious  simulations,  imperfect  simulations,  and  immersion
simulations.
3. The reference class problem : the case of conscious simulations
At this step, it is not yet possible to really talk about the problem of the reference class within
SA. To do so,  it  must  be shown that  the choice of  one or  the other reference class  has
completely different consequences at the level of the argument,  and in particular that the
nature of its conclusion is affected, i.e. fundamentally modified. In what follows, we will
now focus on showing that depending on which reference class is chosen, radically different
conclusions  ensue  at  the  level  of  the  argument  itself  and  that,  consequently,  there  is  a
reference class  problem within  SA. For  this  purpose,  we will  consider  several  reference
classes in turn, focusing on how conclusions of a fundamentally different nature result from
them at the level of the argument itself.
The original version of SA implicitly depicts simulations of humans of a certain type.
These are virtual simulations,  almost indistinguishable from real humans and that present
thus a very high degree of sophistication. Moreover, these are a type of simulations that are
not  aware  that  they  are  themselves  simulated  and are  therefore  convinced  that  they  are
genuine humans. This is implicit in the terms of the argument itself and in particular, the
inference from (9) to (3) which leads to the conclusion that ʻweʼ are currently living in an
indistinguishable simulation carried out by post-humans. In fact, these are simulations that
are  somehow  abused  and  misled  by  post-humans  regarding  their  true  identity.  For  the
purposes of this discussion, we shall term quasi-humans- the simulated humans who are not
aware that they are human.
At this stage, it appears that it is also possible to conceive of indistinguishable simulations
that have an identical degree of sophistication but that, on the other hand, would be aware
that they are being simulated. We shall then call  quasi-humans+ the simulated humans who
are aware that they are themselves simulations. Such simulations are in all respects identical
to the quasi-humans- to which SA implicitly refers, with the only difference that they are this
time clearly aware of their intrinsic nature of simulation. Intuitively, SA also applies to this
type of simulation. A priori, there is no justification for excluding such a type of simulation.
Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that  quasi-humans+ may be more numerous
than  quasi-humans-. For ethical reasons (i) first of all, it may be thought that post-humans
might be inclined to prefer  quasi-humans+ to  quasi-humans-. For the fact of conferring an
existence on quasi-humans constitutes a deception as to their true identity, whereas such an
inconvenient is absent in the case of  quasi-humans+.  Such deception could reasonably be
considered unethical and lead to some form of prohibition of quasi-humans-. Another reason
(ii) is that simulations of humans who are aware of their own simulation nature should not be
6dismissed a priori. Indeed, we can think that the level of intelligence acquired by some quasi-
humans in the near future could be extremely high and in this case, the simulations would
very quickly become aware that they are themselves simulations. It may be thought that from
a certain degree of intelligence, and in particular that which may be obtained by humanity in
the not too distant future (Kurtzweil, 2000, 2005; Bostrom, 2006), quasi-humans should be
able  — at least much more easily than at present  — to collect evidence that they are the
subject of a simulation. Furthermore (iii), the very concept of “unconscious simulation that it
is a simulation” could be inherently contradictory, because it  would then be necessary to
limit one's intelligence and therefore, it would no longer constitute an indistinguishable and
sufficiently realistic simulation6. These three reasons suggest that  quasi-humans+ may well
exist in greater numbers than quasi-humans- — or even that they may even be the only type
of simulation implemented by post-humans.
At this stage, it is worth considering the consequences of taking into account the quasi-
humans+ within the simulation reference class inherent to SA. For this purpose, let us first
consider the variation of SA (let us term it SA*) that applies, exclusively, to the class of
quasi-humans+. Such a choice, first of all,  has no consequence on the disjunct (1) of SA,
which refers to a possible disappearance of our humanity before it  has reached the post-
human stage.  Nor does this  has any effect on the disjunct  (2),  according to  which post-
humans will not perform quasi-humans+, i.e. conscious simulations of human beings. On the
other hand, the choice of such a reference class has a direct consequence on the disjunct (3)
of SA. Certainly,  it  follows, in the same way as for the original argument, the first level
conclusion that the number of quasi-humans+ will far exceed the number of authentic humans
(the  disproportion).  However,  the second level  conclusion that  “we” are currently quasi-
humans no longer follows. Indeed, such a conclusion (let  us call  it  self-applicability)  no
longer applies to us, since we are not aware that we are being simulated and are completely
convinced that we are authentic humans. Thus, in this particular context, the inference from
(9) to (3) no longer prevails. Indeed, what constitutes SA's  worrying conclusion no longer
results from step (9), since we cannot identify with the quasi-humans+, the latter being clearly
aware that they are evolving in a simulation. Thus, unlike the original version of SA based on
the reference class that associates humans with quasi-humains-, this new version associating
humans  with  quasi-humans+ is  not  associated  with  such  a  disturbing  conclusion.  The
conclusion  that  now  follows,  as  we  can  see,  is  quite  reassuring,  and  in  any  case  very
different from the deeply worrying7 conclusion that results from the original argument.
At this stage, it appears that a question arises: should we identify, in the context of SA, the
reference class  to  the  quasi-humans- or  the  quasi-humans+?8 It  appears  that  no objective
6 It seems difficult to rule out here the case where  quasi-humans- discover, at least fortuitously, that they are
simulated humans, thus becoming  quasi-humans+ from that moment on. However, in order to advantage the
paradox,  we will  consider  here that  the very notion of an indistinguishable simulation is not plagued with
contradiction.
7 Bostrom (2003) considers that the fact that we live in a simulation would only moderately affect our daily
lives: “Supposing we live in a simulation, what are the implications for us humans? The foregoing remarks
notwithstanding, the implications are not all that radical”. However, it may be thought that the effect should be
much more profound, given that the fundamental level of reality is not where the simulation subjects believe it
to be and that, as a result, many of their beliefs are completely erroneous. As David Chalmers (2005) points it
out: “The brain is massively deluded, it seems. It has all sorts of false beliefs about the world. It believes that it
has a body, but it has no body. It believes that it is walking outside in the sunlight, but in fact it is inside a dark
lab. It believes it is one place, when in fact it may be somewhere quite different”.
8 For the purposes of this discussion, we present things as an alternative between  quasi-humans- and  quasi-
humans+. However, one could conceive that post-humans – perhaps different post-human civilizations – create
both  quasi-humans- and  quasi-humans+. We would then have a tripartite situation involving humans,  quasi-
humans- and quasi-humans+. For the sake of simplicity, we can assimilate here such a situation to the one that
prevails when post-humans only create  quasi-humans- since it is sufficient that the latter are present in very
large numbers to create the worrying effect inherent to SA.
7element in SA's statement supports the a priori choice of the  quasi-humans- or the  quasi-
humans+.  Thus,  any version  of  the  argument  that  includes  the  preferential  choice  of  the
quasi-humans- or the  quasi-humans+ appears to be biased. This is the case for the original
version of SA, which thus contains a bias in favor of the quasi-humans-, which results from
Bostrom's choice of a class of simulations that is exclusively assimilated to  quasi-humans-,
i.e. simulations that are not aware of their simulation nature and are therefore abused and
misled by post-humans about the very nature of their identity. And this is also the case for
SA*, the alternative version of SA that has just been described, which includes a particular
bias in favor of  quasi-humans+, simulations that are aware of their own simulation nature.
However, the choice of the reference class is fundamental here, because it has an essential
consequence: if we choose a reference class that associates simulations with quasi-humans,
the result  is  the  worrying conclusion that we are most likely currently experiencing in a
simulation. On the other hand, if a reference class is chosen that identifies simulations with
quasi-humans+, the result is a scenario that reassuringly does not include such a conclusion.
At this stage, it is clear that the choice of the quasi-humans- i.e., non-conscious simulations
— in the original version of SA, to the detriment of conscious simulations, constitutes an
arbitrary  choice.  Indeed,  what  makes  it  possible  to  prefer  the  choice  of  quasi-humans-,
compared to quasi-humans+? Such justification is lacking in the context of the argument. At
this stage, it appears that SA's original argument contains a bias that leads to the preferential
choice of quasi-humans-, and to the alarming conclusion associated with it9.
4. The reference class problem : the case of imperfect simulations
The problem of the reference class within SA relates, as mentioned above, to the very nature
and to the type of simulations referred to in the argument.  Is this problem limited to the
preferential choice, at the level of the original argument, of unconscious simulations, to the
detriment  of  the  alternative  choice  of  conscious  simulations,  which  correspond  to  very
sophisticated  simulations  of  humans,  capable  of  creating  illusion,  but  endowed with  the
awareness that they themselves are simulations? It appears not. Indeed, as mentioned above,
other types of simulations can also be envisaged for which the argument also works, but
which are of a somewhat different nature. In particular, it is conceivable that post-humans
may design and implement simulations that are identical to those of the original argument,
but that are not as perfect in essence. Such a situation is quite likely and does not have the
ethical disadvantages that could accompany the indistinguishable simulations staged in the
original  argument.  The  choice  to  carry  out  such  simulations  could  be  the  result  of  the
necessary technological level, or of deliberate and pragmatic choices, designed to save time
and resources. These could be, for example, simulations of excellent quality such that the
scientific inhabitants of the simulations could only discover their artificial nature after, for
example, ten years of research. Such simulations could be carried out in very large numbers
and, given their  less resource-intensive nature,  could occur in even greater numbers than
quasi-humans-. For the purposes of this discussion, we will call  imperfect simulations this
category of simulations.
At this stage, one can ask oneself what are the consequences on SA of taking into account
a reference class that identifies itself with imperfect simulations? In this case, it follows, in
the same way as the original argument,  that the first  level conclusion that the number of
imperfect simulations will far exceed the number of authentic humans (the  disproportion).
But  here  too,  however,  the  second  level  conclusion  that  “we”  are  currently  imperfect
9 This  type  of  bias  can  be  analyzed  in  one  instance  of  the  one-sidedness  bias (Walton,  1999,  p.  76-81,
Franceschi, 2014, p. 587-592) where the reference class is that of the simulations and the associated duality is
consciousness/unconsciousness.
8simulations (self-applicability) no longer follows. The latter no longer applies to us and a
reassuring conclusion replaces it, since we are clearly aware that we are not such imperfect
simulations. Finally, it turns out that the conclusion that results from taking into account the
class of imperfect simulations is of the same nature as that which follows when considering
the class of the quasi-humans+.
5. The reference class problem : the case of  immersion simulations
As we have  seen,  extending  the  SA reference  class  to  conscious  simulations  leads  to  a
conclusion of a different nature from the one that results from the original argument. The
same applies to another category of simulations — imperfect simulations — which lead to a
conclusion of the same nature as conscious simulations, and which in any case turns out to be
different  from that  resulting  from taking  into  account  the  simulations  mentioned  in  the
original argument. At this stage, the question arises as to whether the reference class can not
be assimilated to other types of simulations relevant from the point of view of SA and whose
consideration would lead to a conclusion that is inherently different from that which follows
when  considering  the  simulations  of  the  original  argument,  or  conscious  or  imperfect
simulations.
In particular, the question arises as to whether human simulations, which would be such as
to apply to ourselves — in a sense that may differ from the original argument — and which
would include the conclusion of self-applicability inherent in SA, could not exist in a more or
less near future. Some answers can be provided by considering an evolution of the concepts
of virtual reality that are already being implemented in different fields such as psychiatry,
surgery,  industry,  military  training,  entertainment,  etc.  In  psychiatry  in  particular,  virtual
universes  are  used  to  implement  techniques  related  to  behavioral  therapies,  and  offer
advantages over traditional in vivo scenarios (Powers & Emmelkamp, 2008). In this type of
treatment,  the patient  himself  is  simulated  using  an avatar  and the universe in  which he
evolves is also simulated in the most realistic way possible. Convincing results have been
obtained in the treatment of some phobias (Choy & al., 2007, Parsons & Rizzo, 2008), as
well as post-traumatic stress disorder (Cukor & al., 2009, Baños & al., 2011).
In this context, it is conceivable that developments in this concept of virtual reality could
lead to the realization of simulated humans, which would require a high degree of realism.
This  would require,  in  particular,  the completion  of  current  research,  particularly  on the
simulation of the human brain. It is possible that significant progress may be made in the
near future (Moravec, 1998; Kurzweil, 2005; Sandberg and Bostrom, 2008; De Garis et al.
al., 2010). It is also conceivable that we will then have the ability to immerse ourselves in
simulated universes by borrowing the personalities of humans thus simulated, while really
having  — the  time  of  immersion  — the  impression  that  this  is  our  real  existence10.  In
addition, the same human simulation could take the form of multiple variations that would
correspond to the purpose  — therapeutic,  scientific,  playful, utilitarian,  historical,  etc.  —
sought during the immersion. For example, it is conceivable that some variations may only
include  important  elements  of  the  simulated  personality's  life,  neglecting  uninteresting
details. For the purposes of this discussion, we can term this type of simulation: immersion
simulations. In this context, humans could thus frequently resort to immersion in a simulated
anterior  human  personality.  It  is  also  possible  that  individuals  may  use  simulations  of
themselves:  they  could  be  simulations  of  themselves  at  earlier  times  in  their  lives,  with
10 A complete simulation of a human brain is also called an upload. One definition (Sandberg & Bostrom, 2008,
p. 7) is as follows:  :  “The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a
software model of it that is so faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in
essentially the same way as the original brain.”
9eventual slight variations, however, depending on the purpose sought for the immersion in
question. In such circumstances, it is conceivable that very large quantities of this type of
simulation could be carried out by computer means. In any case, it appears that the number of
simulations at our disposal would be much greater than the inhabitants of our planet. In this
context, it appears that SA functions in the same way as the original argument if we reason in
relation to a reference class that identifies itself with this type of immersion simulations.
At this point, it is worth considering the effect on SA of assimilating the reference class to
immersion simulations. In such a context, it appears that the first-level consequence based on
the humans/simulations  disproportion would apply here, in the same way as the original
argument. Secondly, and this is an important consequence, the second level conclusion based
on  self-applicability would now apply,  since we can conclude that “we” are also,  in this
extended sense,  simulations.  On the  other  hand,  it  would  no longer  follow the alarming
conclusion, which is that of the original argument and which manifests itself at a third level,
that we are unconscious simulations, since the fact that we are in this sense simulations does
not  imply  here  that  we  are  mistaken  about  our  first  identity.  Thus,  unlike  the  original
argument,  the  result  is  a  reassuring conclusion:  humans  are  occasionally  immersion
simulations, while being aware that they use them.
Could we not object here that we have not yet reached the state where we can identify,
even if only temporarily, with such immersion simulations and that this does not make the
above developments relevant to SA? Strictly speaking, the virtual reality implemented in our
time can indeed be considered too coarse in nature to be assimilated to the very realistic
simulations  hinted  at  by  Bostrom.  However,  it  can  be  assumed  that  only  high-quality
immersion simulations, which would give the illusion at least the time of their use that they
are a real existence, could be carried out, for such simulations to become relevant for the SA
reference class. The hypothesis that such a technological level,  based on an explosion of
artificial  intelligence,  could be achieved within a few decades has thus been put forward
(Kurzweil,  2005;  Eden et  al.  al.,  2013).  If  such a  technological  evolution  were to  occur
within,  for  example,  a  few  decades,  could  we  not  then  legitimately  consider  that  such
simulations  also  fall  within  the  reference  class  of  SA?  Given  this  possible  temporal
proximity, it seems appropriate to take into account the case of immersion simulations and to
evaluate their consequences for SA11.
6. The different levels of conclusion according to the chosen reference class
Finally, the preceding discussion emphasizes that if SA is considered in light of its inherent
reference  class  problem,  there  are  actually  several  levels  in  the  conclusion  of  SA:  (C1)
disproportion; (C2) self-applicability; (C3) unconsciousness (the worrying fact that we are
fooled, deceived about our primary identity). In fact, the previous discussion shows that (C1)
11 The above also shows that when examining SA carefully, it can be seen that the argument contains a second
reference  class.  This  second  reference  class  is  that  of  post-humans.  What  is  a  post-human?  Should  we
assimilate this class to civilizations far superior to ours, to those that will evolve in the 25th century or the 43th
century? Should the descendants of  our current  human race who will  live in the 22nd century be counted
among the post-humans if they were to make considerable technological progress in the field of simulations? In
any case, the definition of the post-human class appears to be closely linked to that of simulations. Because if
we  are  interested,  in  a  broad  sense,  in  immersion  simulations,  then  post-humans  can  be  assimilated  to  a
generation of humans not very far from us. If we consider imperfect simulations, then they should be associated
with a more distant time. On the other hand, if we consider, in a more restrictive sense, simulations of humans
that are completely indistinguishable from our current humanity, then we should be interested in post-humans
from a much more distant era. Thus, the class of post-humans appears to be closely correlated with that of
simulations, because the degree of evolution of simulations is related to the level reached by the post-human
civilizations that implement them. For this reason, we shall limit the present discussion to the reference class of
the simulations.
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is true regardless of the chosen (by restriction or extension) reference class: quasi-humans -,
quasi-humans+, imperfect simulations and immersion simulations. In addition, (C2) is also
true for the original reference class of quasi-humans- — and for immersion simulations, but
is false for the class of quasi-humans+ and imperfect simulations. Finally, (C3) is true for the
original  reference  class  of  quasi-humans-,  but  it  proves  to  be  false  for  quasi-humans+,
imperfect  simulations  and  immersion  simulations.  These  three  levels  of  conclusion  are
represented in the table below:
level conclusion case quasi-
humans-
quasi-
humans+
imperfect
simulations
immersion
simulations
C1
the  proportion  of  simulated
humans will  far  exceed that
of humans (disproportion)
C1A true true true true
the  proportion  of  simulated
humans will not significantly
exceed that of humans
C1Ā false false false false
C2
we  are  most  likely
simulations  (self-
applicability)
C2A true false false true
we  are  most  likely  not
simulations
C2Ā false true true false
C3
we  are  unconscious
simulations  of  their
simulation  nature
(unconsciousness)
C3A true false false false
we  are  not  unconscious
simulations  of  their
simulation nature
C3Ā false true true true
Figure 1. The different levels of conclusion within SA
as well as in the following tree structure:
11
Figure 2. Tree of the different levels of  conclusion of SA
While SA's original conclusion suggests that there is only one level of conclusion, it turns
out, however, as just pointed out, that there are in fact several levels of conclusion in SA,
when the argument is examined from a broader perspective, in the light of the reference class
problem. The conclusion of the original argument (C3A) is itself worrying and alarming, in
that it concludes that there is a much higher probability than we had imagined a priori that we
are humans simulated without being aware of it. However, the above analysis shows that,
depending on the chosen reference class, some conclusions of a very different nature can be
inferred by the simulation argument. Thus, a completely different conclusion is associated
with the choice of the reference class of the  quasi-humans+ or  imperfect simulations. The
resulting conclusion is  that we are not such simulations  (C2Ā). Finally,  another possible
conclusion, itself associated with the choice of the immersion simulation class, is that we are
eventually part of such a simulation class, but we are aware of it and therefore it is not a
cause for concern (C3Ā).
The above analysis  finally  highlights  what  is  wrong with  the  original  version  of  SA,
which is at a twofold level. First, the original argument focuses on the class of simulations
that are not aware of their own simulation nature. This leads to a succession of conclusions
that there will be a greater proportion of simulated humans than authentic humans (C1A),
that we are part of simulated humans (C2A) and finally that we are, more likely than we
might  have  imagined  a  priori,  simulated  humans  unaware  of  being  (C3A).  However,  as
mentioned above, the very notion of human simulation is ambiguous, and such a class can in
fact be defined in different ways, given that there is no objective criterion in SA for choosing
such a class in a way that is not arbitrary. We can indeed choose the reference class by
identifying the simulations with unconscious simulations, i.e. quasi-humans- simulations. But
the  alternative  choice  of  a  reference  class  that  identifies  itself  with  simulations  that  are
conscious of being simulations themselves, i.e.  quasi-humans+, has equal legitimacy. In the
original argument, there is no objective criterion for choosing the reference class in a non-
arbitrary way.  Thus,  the fact  of  favoring,  in  the original  argument,  the choice of  quasi-
humans- — with  the  alarming  conclusion  associated  with  them  — over  quasi-humans+,
constitutes a bias, as well as the choice of a reference class that identifies itself with quasi-
humans+, leads this time to a reassuring conclusion.
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Secondly, it  appears that the reference class of SA can be defined at a certain level of
restriction or extension. The choice in the original argument of the quasi-humans- — occurs
at a certain level of restriction.  But  if we now move to a certain level of extension,  the
reference class now includes  imperfect simulations. And if we place ourselves at an even
greater  level  of  extension,  simulations  include  not  only  imperfect  simulations,  but  also
immersion simulations. But depending on whether the class is chosen at a particular level of
restriction or extension, a completely different conclusion will follow. Thus, the choice, at a
higher  level  of  extension,  of  imperfect  simulations  leads  to  a  reassuring  conclusion.
Similarly,  at  an  even  greater  level  of  extension,  which  this  time  includes  immersion
simulations, there also follows a new reassuring conclusion. Thus, the above analysis shows
that in the original version of SA, the choice is made preferentially, by restriction, on the
reference class of quasi-humans-, to which is associated a worrying conclusion, as well as a
choice  by  extension,  also  taking  into  account  imperfect  simulations or  immersion
simulations, leads to a reassuring conclusion.
Can we not object, at this stage, that the above analysis leads to a change in the original
scenario of SA and that it is no longer the same problem12? To this, it can be replied that the
previous analysis is based on variations in SA that preserve the very structure of the original
argument.  What  this  analysis  shows  is  that  this  same  structure  is  likely  to  produce
conclusions  of  a  very  different  nature,  as  long  as  the  reference  class  is  varied  within
reasonable limits  that  correspond to the context of SA, and even though the original  SA
statement suggests a single type of conclusion. Bostrom himself emphasizes that it  is the
structure of  the argument  that  constitutes  its  real  core:  “The  structure of  the Simulation
Argument does not depend on the nature of the hypothetical beings that would be created by
the  technologically  mature  civilizations.  If  instead  of  computer  simulations  they  created
enormous numbers of brains in vats connected to a suitable virtual reality simulation, the
same effect could in principle be achieved.” (Bostrom, 2005). In addition, the different levels
of  extension  used  here  to  highlight  variations  in  the  SA reference  class  are  intended  to
illustrate how different levels of conclusion can result. But if we wish to preserve the very
form of the original argument, we can then limit the variation of the reference class to what
really  constitutes  the  core  of  this  analysis,  by  considering  only  a  reference  class  that
identifies itself with the quasi-humans. The reference class is then made up of both quasi-
humans- and quasi-humans+. This is sufficient to generate a reassuring conclusion — which
is not taken into account in the original argument — and thus modify the general conclusion
resulting from the argument. In this case, it is the same reference class as the one underlying
the  original  argument,  with  the  only  difference  that  simulations  knowing  that  they  are
simulated are now part of it. Because the latter, whose possible existence is not mentioned in
the original argument, nevertheless have an equal right to legitimacy in the context of SA.
Finally,  the  preferential  choice  in  the  original  argument  of  the  quasi-humans- class,
appears to be an arbitrary choice that no objective criterion justifies,  while other choices
deserve  equal  legitimacy.  For  the  SA statement  does  not  contain  any objective  element
allowing the choice of the reference class to be made in a non-arbitrary manner.  In this
context, the worrying conclusion associated with the original argument also turns out to be an
arbitrary conclusion, since there are several other reference classes that have an equal degree
of relevance to the argument itself, and from which a quite reassuring conclusion follows.13 14
12 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
13 The resulting double weakening of SA finally makes it possible to reconcile SA with our pre-theoretical
intuitions, because the worrying scenario of the original argument now coexists with several scenarios of a
quite reassuring nature.
14 The  present  analysis  is  a  direct  application  to  the  Simulation  Argument  of  the  form  of  dialectical
contextualism described in Franceschi (2014).
I thank two anonymous referees for Philosophiques, for very useful comments on an earlier version of this
article.
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